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The author is to be applauded for probing how data and models are employed in the practice of hydroinformatics.
In particular, his approach from the point of view of an engineer who wishes to predict the consequences of unobserved interventions in the aquatic environment is welcome. The purpose of this comment is to scrutinize some aspects of the author's reasoning, which on the whole he justifies on the basis of his admirable experience and intuition, in order to establish whether or not it can be placed on a more sound theoretical footing by recourse to modern theories of uncertainty.
I would like to begin by suggesting a change in terminology, a suggestion that, as I hope I will demonstrate, is based on more than pedantry. The author refers to 'deterministic' models as the opposite of 'data-driven' models.
However, the distinguishing feature of the class of models he refers to as 'deterministic' is not their purported determinism, but rather that they are based on general and accepted physical principles, such as conservation of mass and momentum. In other words, they are physics-based or mechanistic models. By suggesting that physics-based models are not necessarily deterministic I am not entertaining the ontological question as to whether or not reality is deterministic. I am merely making the practical point that because a model is physics-based, the modeller does not have to employ it in a deterministic mode.
Probabilistic, fuzzy or more generally imprecise quantities, not just point-valued quantities, may all be propagated through physics-based models (Hall 2003) .
Moreover, there is no reason why, even with point-valued inputs, a physics-based model need generate a unique point-valued output-in other words it may enact a multivalued mapping (Dempster 1967) . Recognizing that physics-based models need not be deterministic is more than a mere technicality. It unlocks uncertainty theory that can provide a theoretical basis for the modified modelling paradigm the author proposes.
The author sets great store by the assertion that mechanistic models are 'compelling, appealing, simple and related to the physics' (his italics). These are indeed persuasive and widely held justifications for a hydraulic engineer to believe a model's predictions. However, the psychological appeal of causality may be a double-edged sword (or crutch), which perhaps is what Bertrand Russell had in mind when he offered to purge the word 'causation' from the language of science. Physics-based models are appealing because of their generality, but their generality will always, in theory and perhaps also in practice at scales of relevance to the hydraulic modeller, be bounded, so in principle it could be argued that there is nothing to dis- Data-driven approaches may be unavoidable, and the author fails to acknowledge that they have a respectable tradition of being used to describe the long-term characteristics of weather-related phenomena. Not only are (entirely data-driven) statistical methods more or less universally used to describe long term rainfall, offshore waves and sea surface elevations at a site, it is also customary to use extreme value theory to extrapolate beyond the observed data in order to estimate the severity of very rare events. Naturally great care is required, for example in assessing the stationarity and representativeness of the available data, yet there is seldom a physics-based alternative. The author overlooks the practice of extreme value statistics when he anathematizes extrapolation of databased models.
The author is in danger of misrepresenting some modelling activities, perhaps in an attempt to endow them with a respectability that may not in fact be warranted, by forcing them into the physics-based paradigm. For example, he repeatedly refers to the empirical observation of Manning's n, asserting that n 'can be estimated with sufficient accuracy . . . on the basis of engineering experience'. He doesn't probe the nature of that mysterious 'engineering experience' because of course to do so would reveal that it has built up from many applications of the type of calibration procedure that he goes on to decry! It would be more honest to acknowledge that there is a populous middle ground between the poles of purely physics-based and purely data-based approaches. Surely this is what Babovic et al. (2001) had in mind when they wrote '. . . we strongly believe that the most appropriate way forward is to combine the best of two approaches-theory-driven, understanding-rich, with data-driven modelling processes'. This hybrid position is explicit in Peter Young's (1998 Young's ( , 1999 data-based mechanistic models, in the physical interpretation of the stochastic models of Hall et al. (2002) and in the linguistic interpretation of fuzzy rules learnt from data (Lawry et al., 2004) , all of which might be regarded as different types of 'grey-box' models. Recognition of this middle ground provides the opportunity to avoid the outbreak of war, which the author warns against, between proponents of datadriven and physics-based approaches. It does not merely represent an unsatisfactory staging post on the quest for a reductionist holy grail of purely physics-based approaches. As Beven (2002) has argued there will always be sub-grid-scale processes that we are incapable of exactly measuring at an appropriate scale.
An important feature of the author's proposed modified modelling paradigm is that it is recognized that there will be a window of uncertainty around a model prediction, implying that model predictions should, in general, be regarded as being imprecise. This is quite different to generating probabilistic predictions, where the assumption (in both the Bayesian and the frequentist paradigms) is that as more data are acquired the distribution of model predictions should converge to the distribution of the data. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that given available evidence it is not possible to 
